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GROWTH AND THE CYCLE: CREATIVE
DESTRUCTION VERSUS ENTRENCHMENT
Erik Canton and Harald Uhlig1
CentER, Tilburg University
P.O. Box 90153, 5000 LE, Tilburg, The Netherlands
April 28, 1997
Abstract
Newly established firms often try to secure their market position by building up
a base of loyal customers. While recessions may not destroy technological
leadership, they may be harmful for such firm-customer relationships. Without
such customer bases, these firms find themselves more vulnerable to attacks by
competitors. We formulate this idea within an Aghion-Howitt-type model of
creative destruction and discuss its implications for growth. In the context of this
model, recessions might be good for growth since they weaken the incumbent
firm’s position, and thereby stimulate research by outside firms. The model
allows for the extreme case where the leading firm can be so entrenched that
growth ceases, unless a recession shakes up its customer base. We find a one-to-
one relationship between the average growth rate and the cyclical variability, a
U-shaped relationship between the average speed of building up good customer
relationships and the average growth rate, and a positive relationship between the
arrival rate of recessions and average growth. It is finally shown that an approp-
riate stochastic tax program can implement the social planner’s solution. In some
cases, general equilibrium effects may generate interesting results, conflicting
with intuition from a partial equilibrium approach: we show that, in some cases,
a social planner might want to subsidize research in order to discourage it.
1. Introduction
Technological breakthroughs are often not enough to strongly establish a firm in the
market. It also needs further marginal improvements of the product according to customer
needs, or to build up consumer recognition to secure its position. Building up such a
position takes time. And while recessions may not destroy technological breakthroughs,
they may be seen as disrupting such firm-customer relationships. Thus, firms who have
1 Suggestions from Henri de Groot, Jos Jansen and participants of the ENTER Jamboree,
January 1997, are greatfully acknowledged.
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not yet built such relationships or whose relationships have gotten destroyed in a recessi-
on, find themselves more vulnerable to attacks by competitors than those that did. We
formulate this idea within an Aghion-Howitt-type model of creative destruction (see
Aghion and Howitt, 1992) and study its implications for growth. In particular, if the lead
firm lacks an established position, the competitors’ incentives for attacks are increased,
leading to higher R&D efforts on their part in the hope of leapfrogging the leader. Thus,
in this model, recessions are actually good for growth, since they encourage new creative
destruction. Booms and established market leads, on the other hand, can in the extreme
completely eliminate all desire for R&D, leading to complete entrenchment of the leader
and to a stand-still in growth, until the next recession destroys the secure market lead.
This paper fits within the literature on creative destruction, initiated by Schumpeter
(1942), and more recently by Segerstrom, Anant, and Dinopoulos (1990) and Aghion and
Howitt (1992).2 Economic growth is driven by the process of creative destruction,i.e. the
introduction of new products by innovating firms and the replacement of incumbent
market leaders. The contribution of this paper is that we distinguish fundamental innovati-
ons leading to creative destruction from marginal innovations that slow down the process
of creative destruction. The marginal innovations in our model capture the build-up of a
well-functioning firm-customer relationship. Strong market leaders with a loyal customer
base can - at least partially - insulate themselves from the threat of leapfrogging by
potential entrants. Secondly, along the lines of Caballero and Hammour (1994), we
analyze the cleansing effect of recessions by assuming that established firm-customer
relationships will be destroyed in a recession. In order to keep the analysis analytically
tractable, we assume that marginal innovations and recessions are exogenous stochastic
events. The intermediate firm cannot influence the probability of achieving a strong
customer base. Likewise, recessions are interpreted as sudden disruptions of such loyal
customer bases.
Related ideas have received some attention in the recent literature. Cheng and
Dinopoulos (1993) construct a model of Schumpeterian growth driven by asymmetric
technological opportunities in the form of high-cost high-quality breakthroughs and low-
cost low-quality improvements. They assume that each product generation starts with a
2 An overview of Schumpeterian growth theory can be found in Dinoupolos (1996).
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quality breakthrough, followed by a single improvement. The pattern of growth and
fluctuations can then be described as a stationary market equilibrium in which R&D races
alternate between a breakthrough and an improvement. Our approach is different in the
sense that we allow incumbent firms to gain from experience: firms that are longer in the
market are more likely to carry out marginal improvements, or to establish a loyal
customer base. Stein (1997) develops a model of creative destruction in which firms
compete on product quality and on distribution costs. A firm’s innovation in product
quality ultimately spills over to new firms, whereas distribution costs are taken to be firm-
specific: incumbent firms have an advantage over their potential competitors when they
can reduce distribution costs through loyalty of their customers. In line with our results,
Stein finds that firm-specific learning-by-doing may discourage research activity and
thereby reduce long-term economic growth. In contrast with Stein’s analysis, we take
account of the possibility that such firm-specific advantage may suddenly be disrupted by
the event of a recession. Li (1996) analyzes an R&D-based growth model where the
heterogeneous nature of technical progress is captured by distinguishing between funda-
mental and secondary innovations. Li underlines heterogeneity in the stock of knowledge,
giving rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria. In our analysis we distinguish between
fundamental knowledge which spills over to other firms, and firm-specific knowledge
leading to a loyal customer base or to minor product improvements. Jovanovic and Rob
(1990) explore the link between long-run productivity growth and the length and amplitu-
de of business cycle fluctuations in the context of a model that formalizes the distinction
between extensive and intensive search. Extensive search is directed at major breakthroug-
hs, while intensive search aims to refine such fundamental breakthroughs. Caballero and
Hammour (1996) analyze the timing, pace, and efficiency of job creation and destruction
resulting from product and process innovation. While an efficient economy concentrates
such job reallocation processes during recessions (because of the opportunity cost effect),
incomplete contracting between labour and capital as well as transactional difficulties may
decouple the synchronized pattern of creation and destruction, leading to technological
"sclerosis". Economic efficiency can be restored through an appropriate mix of govern-
ment policies. We also aim to design optimal tax policies that restore economic efficiency,
but in our story such taxation scheme is shown to be state-contingent.
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In the context of our model, recessions might be good for growth since they
weaken the incumbent firm’s position, and thereby stimulate research by outside firms.
The model allows for the extreme case, where the leading firm can be so entrenched that
growth ceases unless a recession shakes up its customer base. We find a one-to-one
relationship between the average growth rate and the cyclical variability, a U-shaped
relationship between the average speed of building up good customer relationships and the
average growth rate, and a positive relationship between the arrival rate of recessions and
average growth. We do not view these claims as immediately testable empirical predicti-
ons of our model, however. Rather we like to think of our model as just analyzing one of
many facets of economic fluctuations in isolation. For the same reason, we have abstained
from attempting a serious calibration exercise. In our view, such a calibration exercise can
only be done on the basis of a more complete, but thus also more complicated analysis of
all the facets involved. We proceed along the following lines. Section 2 introduces the
model, derives optimality conditions, and describes the equilibrium solution. Some
interesting numerical examples are discussed in section 3 to describe some special features
of the model. In particular, we study the possibility of entrenchment: strong market leaders
can in the extreme completely eliminate incentives to carry out R&D by potential
competitors, leading to complete entrenchment in the market and to a stand-still in
economic growth. The model’s implications for growth and the business cycle are more
elaborately discussed in section 4. Out-of-equilibrium dynamics will be considered in
section 5. Since the equilibrium solution of the model is not an efficient solution, we will
investigate the policy selected by a benevolent social planner in section 6. In section 7 it
is shown that an appropriate stochastic tax program can implement the social planner’s
solution. In some cases, general equilibrium effects may generate interesting results,
conflicting with intuition from a partial equilibrium approach: we show that, in some
cases, a social planner might want to subsidize research in order to discourage it. Briefly,
the intuition is that the market leader has to pay taxes to finance these research subsidies.
This may lower its value by a substantial amount, so that firms in the research sector
expect substantially lower gains from innovative activity, and actually decide to undertake
less research activity. If this sounds not yet convincing, we hope that it entices to read




Consider an economy with three classes of tradeable objects: labour, a consumption good,
and an intermediate good. Time is continuous. All markets are perfectly competitive,
except for the intermediate goods market. The economy is populated with a continuum of
infinitely-lived, representative agents. These agents choose contingency plans for lifetime
consumption, evaluated at a constant rate of time preferencer>0 and linear instantaneous
utility. Thus, r is also the rate of interest.
The agents also supply labour. Labour supply is constant, inelastic, and normalized
to unity. Two categories of labour are distinguished: unskilled labour, which can only be
used in the production of the final good which is used for consumption, and skilled labour,
which can be employed in research and in the intermediate sector.
Production takes place in two sectors: a competitive final goods sector and a
monopolistic intermediate goods sector. Furthermore, there is a sector undertaking
research. A firm in the competitive final goods sector hires unskilled labourm and
purchases the amountx of the intermediate good to produce outputy according to (leaving
away the time subscript)
where F is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and differentiable. The factorAf is the
(1)
current productivity of final goods production "embodied" in the intermediate good: more
advanced intermediate goods allow final goods production firms to produce with higher
total factor productivity. Normalizing the aggregate quantity of unskilled labour to unity,
aggregate production isy=AfF(x).
The productivity Af is thus intimately tied to the particular intermediate inputx
which is used, and which is sold by a monopoly. Fundamental innovations increase this
productivity by a fixed factorγ. Therefore, the time profile of the productivity parameter
is given by
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f=0,1,2,3,... denotes the fundamental innovation. A fundamental innovation brings about a
(2)
new intermediate input allowing firms in the final goods sector to produce more efficient-
ly. The new intermediate product renders existing ones obsolete. Thus, fundamental
innovations replace the existing intermediate firm by a new monopoly in the now leading
technology : economic growth is driven by creative destruction. It will be assumed that
fundamental innovations occur randomly with Poisson arrival rateλn, wheren is the flow
of skilled labour used in research. The research sector itself is competitive, but a succes-
sful innovator can protect his fundamental innovation by a patent which he can use to
monopolize the intermediate sector. According to eq. 2, the knowledge incorporated in a
new intermediate input ultimately spills over to new firms: innovators stand on the
shoulders of giants.
The production function of the intermediate goodx is linear,
L is the flow of skilled labour used in the intermediate sector. To capture the idea that an
(3)
intermediate firm needs further marginal improvements of the product according to
customer needs, or to build up consumer recognition to secure its position, we introduce
the parameterB. For simplicity, we assume thatB can only take two values:B∈{ δ,1}. If
B=δ>1, the intermediate firm is a strong market leader, but ifB=1 the monopolist is a
weak market leader.
According to eq. 3, the strength of the monopolist is reflected in parameterB. It
should however be noted that there is no formal difference between technical improve-
ments in the final goods sector or in the intermediate goods sector. Total factor producti-
vity of the final goods sector is determined by the current technology of the intermediate
monopolist. Thus, the establishment of strong market leadership by the intermediate
monopolist also translates into increased productivity in final goods production.
Our assumption of a "one intermediate good economy" is an extreme case. The
opposite extreme would be an economy with many monopolists in different industries.
Fluctuations between weak and strong market leadership at the level of the intermediate
firms will be washed out via the law of large numbers. However, our assumption of one
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intermediate monopolist would still be valid when labour movements between sectors are
"slow".
Newly established firms can secure their market position by building up a base of
loyal customers. Experience from being in the market can turn a weak market leader into
a strong one. We specify this learning-by-doing as an exogenous stochastic Markov
process, where µ is the Poisson arrival rate for a weak monopolist to become strong. To
put it differently, we simply assume that older firms are more likely to have a loyal
customer base than young ones (ceteris paribus).
While recessions may not destroy technological breakthroughs, they may be seen as
disrupting such firm-customer relationships. The event of a recession will consequently
turn a strong monopolist into a weak one. Specifically, let us assume that the Poisson
arrival rate of a recession is given byν.
It is probably more realistic to assume that the intermediate firm can at least partly
influence the probability of becoming a strong market leader,e.g. via active marketing
campaigns or through additional investments in the product or its distribution channels.
However, the establishment of a loyal customer base is also likely to be affected by some
randomness. Firms can try to promote their products, but the success or failure of such
conduct is also determined by unpredictable or unexpected factors. In order to keep the
analysis analytically tractable, we take an extreme position and assume that marginal
innovations are purely exogenous stochastic events. The intermediate firm cannot influence
the probability of becoming strong. Likewise, recessions may relate to a broad range of
events, including negative productivity changes, disturbances on the demand side, or
difficulties with regard to market interactions between relevant parties. Our interpretation
of recessions as sudden disruptions of such loyal customer bases is thus one out of
different possibilities.
To rule out the possibility of strategic behaviour, we henceforth assume thatγ>δ:
the size of drastic innovations in the productivity of final output is larger than the size of
marginal innovations in the intermediate goods sector from learning-by-doing.
Consider a firm which has made thef-th innovation. During its lifetime, the
intermediate firm can find itself in two different states. In the first state, the incumbent
firm is a weak market leader. In the second state, the incumbent firm is strong. After some
random time span, the incumbent monopolist will be superseded by a new intermediate
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firm through the event of thef+1-th fundamental innovation.
The various transitions across states initiated by fundamental and marginal
innovations can be tabulated as follows. Denoting the state of thef-t intermediate firm by
i and the state of the new firm byj, we have the following transition structure during a
small time intervaldt:
f f+1 transition probability
i=1 → j=1 λnf(1)dt
i=2 → j=1 λnf(2)dt
Implicitly, we have assumed the labour input into research to depend only on the indexf
of the innovation,i.e. to be constant in the time interval during which thef-th but not the
f+1-th innovation has been undertaken. In the further analysis we will see that this is
justifiable in equilibrium.
Equivalently, denoting the state of the intermediate firm att (t+dt) by i (j), we have
the following transition structure in case of incremental leaps:
t t+dt transition probability
i=1 → j=2 µdt
i=2 → j=1 νdt
An equilibrium are lists of firm values (Vf
(i)), research labour (nf
(i)), intermediate
goods production (xf
(i)), intermediate goods labour (Lf
(i)), wages for skilled labour (wf
(i)),
and profits (πf(i)) for f=0,1,2,... andi=1,2 so that at each levelf and each statei,
(i) the current intermediate goods monopolist maximizes instantaneous profits, given
wageswf
(i),
Note that we have substituted in the demand function for the intermediate good
sector, resulting from the final goods production sector.
(ii ) The firm value is given by
where Pf
(i)(t,j) is the probability that the current intermediate good monopolist is
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still the market leadert time units from now, and is in statej then.
(iii ) Given the wagewf
(i), the competitive R&D firms maximize the instantaneous profits
from R&D, calculated as the instantaneous value of a successful innovation times
its instantaneous probability, minus the instantaneous wage costs,
(iv) The market for skilled labour clears,
whereN denotes the mass of skilled individuals.
2.2 The maximization problems
Having finished the description of the economy, we now turn to the optimality conditions.
At each instant in time, the monopolist can be in two different states, as described above.
Therefore, two Bellman equations need to be constructed. For instance, when the interme-
diate firm is currently in the weak state, it makes the instantaneous profit,πf(1). The
probability of still being a monopolist after a small time intervaldt has elapsed is equal to
1-λnf(1)dt. Within this interval, the (unconditional) probability of a marginal innovation is
µdt. By the event of a marginal innovation the monopolist switches to the second state,
and the firm’s value is given byVf
(2). With probability 1-µdt-λnf(1)dt the firm does not
make the transition to state 2 during the time interval but is still the market leader, so that
its value is still given byVf
(1). Proceeding along these lines, the Bellman equations can be




X is the 2×2 matrix from eq. 4,V=[V(1) V(2)]’, and π=[π(1) π(2)]’.
(5)
Consider, next, the research sector. A potential entrant successfully doing research
will start in state 1. The instantaneous expected gain for thef-th innovator when the
current market leader is in statei is thus equal toVf+1
(1)λnf(i)dt -rdt. The instantaneous cost
of doing research iswf
(i)nf
(i)dt, wherewf
(i) denotes the wage of skilled labour. An optimizing
R&D firm choosesnf
(i) so as to equalize both terms, takingV and w as given. It follows
that
with at least one equality.
(6)
Firms in the final goods sector choosexf




taking the relative price of the intermediate goodpf
(i) as given. The first order condition
for firms in the final goods sector is thus given by
Consequently, the intermediate firm choosesxf





optimality condition is given by
whereωf(i)=wf(i)/Af is the productivity-adjusted wage.
(8)
2.3 Stationary equilibrium
In a stationary equilibrium, variables do not depend on the statef. Unless otherwise
indicated, we concentrate in the sequel on interior equilibria, while the situation where no
research is undertaken by outside firms and the incumbent monopolist is entrenched and
completely insulated from creative destruction will be discussed as a special case in
section 3 (Example 4). At each instant in time, the economy only needs to decide upon the
allocation of skilled labour between manufacturing and research.
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To determineω(i), we defineṼ(i)=Vf(i)/Af and make use of the following Proposition:
Proposition 1:
In stationary interior equilibrium it must hold thatω(1)=ω(2)=ω.
Proof:
From eq. 6 and the transition structure for fundamental innovations it follows thatwf
(i)=wf,
or ω(i)=ω.
Notice that this proposition only holds for interior equilibria. The proposition says
that the productivity-adjusted wage of skilled labour is constant across both states. That is,
skilled workers do not benefit from marginal innovations within the intermediate firm.
Using a Cobb-Douglas production function,F(x)=xα, we can readily express the
solution in terms ofω:
where π̃(i)=πf(i)/Af and p̃(i)=pf(i)/Af. For the Cobb-Douglas case, we obtain the stationary
equilibria of the model from the following Proposition:
Proposition 2:
There are in general two solutions forω, given by
wherea, b, andc are stated in the Technical Appendix.
A proof is given in the Technical Appendix.
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3. Results
Using the Cobb-Douglas specification, we turn to some numerical examples to illustrate
the stationary equilibrium (or equilibria). As a baseline, we more or less arbitrarily pick
the following values:r=0.1; A0=B
(1)=N=1; B(2)=1.2; α=0.5; γ=1.4; δ=1.2.
Example 1: Aghion-Howitt
We first discuss the model’s equilibrium solution in the absence of learning-by-doing and
recessions. By setting µ andν equal to zero, we effectively are back in the Aghion-Howitt
world. λ is set at 0.15. Although the fundamental quadratic from Proposition 2 delivers
two equilibrium values forω, only the "positive" root is economically meaningful (more
precisely, only the "positive" root gives a non-negative research intensity). In this example,
31% of the skilled labour force is engaged in research activity.
Example 2: Learning-by-Doing
Next we allow intermediate firms to strengthen their market position by building up a base
of loyal customers. We pick µ=0.5 (leaving other parameters equal). That is, we allow for
the possibility of marginal innovations and assume that marginal leaps are more likely to
take place than fundamental breakthroughs. We findn(1)=0.40 andn(2)=0.28. Sincen(1)>n(2)
and n is positively related to the arrival rate of fundamental innovations, we can refer to
state 1 (no marginal innovation) as the "high growth equilibrium" and state 2 (with
marginal innovation) as the "low growth equilibrium". To put it differently, the creation of
a loyal customer base by the intermediate firm discourages research activity by potential
entrants, and thereby tends to lower economic growth. What is at work here, is a substitu-
tion effect: an intermediate firm making the transition to strong market leadership will set
a lower price for its product, so that the final goods sector increases the demand for these
intermediate inputs. The increased marginal product of workers in producing intermediate
goods is not enough to meet the higher demand, so that more skilled workers need to be
allocated to the manufacturing sector. Labour market clearing is established through
reliefing skilled workers from the research sector, since the expected pay-off from R&D
activity falls.
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Example 3: Learning-by-Doing and Recessions
In the third example, we consider the possibility that strong firm-customer relationships
are destroyed in a recession. The flow probability of recessions,ν, i set at 0.2. With these
parameter values, we have assumed that agents expect recessions to take place less often
than marginal innovations, but more frequent than fundamental innovations. In equilibrium
we haven(1)=0.38 andn(2)=0.26. Although the introduction of recessions tends to reduce
research intensity in both states of the economy, one cannot immediately assess the overall
effect on economic growth. To see this, realize that in the presence of recessions the
economy will spend more time in the high growth equilibrium. We will discuss the
relationship between growth and recessions in greater depth in section 4 below.
Example 4: Entrenchment
We finally turn to the possibility of entrenchment: strong market leaders might completely
eliminate all desire for R&D, leading to complete insulation of the incumbent monopolist
from the process of creative destruction and to a stand-still in growth. Such a scenario will
emerge from our model when (for instance) fundamental innovations occur less frequent.
For λ=0.08 (and µ=0.5,ν=0.2) we have the knife-edge case and findn(1)=0.17 andn(2)=0.
Marginal innovations lead to a stop of research activity and economic growth. Only the
extricating event of a recession can bring the economy out of such a "no-growth trap"
back to a process where firms try to leapfrog each other.
4. Economic growth and the cycle
We will now discuss the model’s implications for economic growth and the cycle. In order
to calculate the average growth rate in the economy, we need to find the expected fraction
of time that the economy spends in each state. From a society’s perspective, we have the
following transition scheme between both states during a small time intervaldt:
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t t+dt transition probability
i=1 → j=1 1-µdt
i=1 → j=2 µdt
i=2 → j=1 (ν+λn(2))dt
i=2 → j=2 (1-(ν+λn(2)))dt
To see this, consider first an intermediate monopolist which is currently in state 1. With
probability λn(1)dt this monopolist will be superseded by a new intermediate firm through
the event of a fundamental innovation during that time interval. This new intermediate
firm will start operation in state 1. A monopolist currently in state 1 will make the
transition to state 2 duringdt with probability µdt. Thus, an incumbent firm which is in
state 1 will maintain its current position during a small time spandt with probability 1-
λn(1)dt-µdt. From a society’s perspective, we thus find that the probability of the economy
still being in the first state afterdt has elapsed is equal to 1-µdt whereas with probability
µdt the economy has moved to the second state. Likewise, consider an intermediate
monopolist which is currently in state 2. With probabilityλn(2)dt this monopolist will be
replaced by a new intermediate firm through the event of a fundamental innovation during
that time span. Again, this new intermediate firm will start operation in state 1. A
monopolist currently in state 2 will face a recession and fall back to state 1 duringdt with
probability νdt. Consequently, an incumbent firm which is in state 2 will maintain its
current position during a small time spandt with probability 1-λn(2)dt-νdt. From a
society’s perspective, we thus find that the probability of the economy still being in the
second state afterdt has elapsed is equal to 1-λn(2)dt-νdt whereas with probability
νdt+λn(2)dt the economy has moved back to the first state.
Denoting the stationary probability that the firm is in statei by q(i) and using that
q(2)=1-q(1), we have in stationary flowq(1)=q(1)(1-µdt)+(1-q(1))(ν+λn(2))dt, or
Naturally, the firm will never become a strong market leader when µ=0. In Aghion and
(9)
Howitt (1992) the average growth rate in the economy equalsλ.n.ln(γ), whereλ.n is the
arrival rate of fundamental innovations. A similar expression can easily be derived by
weighting the research intensity in each state,n(1) andn(2), by the expected fraction of time
that the economy spends in each state, determined by eq. 9. The average growth rate
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(AGR) is thus found to be given by
Following a similar methodology, the variance of the rate of economic growth (VGR) can
(10)
be expressed as
The ratio ofAGRover VGR is constant and equal to 1/lnγ: the average growth rate and the
(11)
variance of the economy’s growth rate are thus related in a linear fashion. Empirical
evidence of such positive interaction between economic growth and the cycle is documen-
ted by Kormendi and Meguire (1985), and Grier and Tullock (1989).
Having determined the economy’s average growth rate and cyclical variability, we
next turn to an evaluation of the effect of learning-by-doing and recessions on this growth
rate. First we vary the speed µ of a marginal innovation,i.e. the effect of learning-by-
doing, within the closed unit interval and study its implications for growth and research in
Figure 1. Panel (a) shows a kind of U-shaped relation between the economy’s average
growth rate and the flow probability of marginal innovations: an increase in µ will tend to
lower economic growth when firms need a relatively long time to learn about their
customers’ needs, whereas an opposite relation is found when firms learn fast. Panel (b)
and (c) of Figure 1 explain the intuition behind this result. A strong market leader
discourages R&D activity by potential entrants by increasing its expected lifetime. As µ is
increased, firms tend to spend more time in the strong state, as Panel (c) shows. This
discourages R&D. Call this the "discouragement-effect". On the other hand, research
intensity n(i) is a positive function of the flow probability µ of marginal innovations: the
prospect of being a strong market leader during a larger fraction of its lifetime increases
the expected gains from fundamental innovations, and thereby stimulates research activity.
Let us refer to this as the "reward-effect". Overall, the discouragement-effect dominates
the reward-effect when firms need a long learning period, whereas the opposite holds
when firms learn fast, leading to the observed U-shaped relation betweenAGRand µ.
We secondly vary the arrival rate of recessions,ν, within the closed unit interval
(setting µ=0.5) and study its implications for growth and research in Figure 2. Panel (a)
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shows a positive relation between the economy’s average growth rate and this arrival rate:
an increase inν will stimulate economic growth. Panel (b) and (c) again show that a
strong market leader discourages R&D activity by potential entrants;n(2) is smaller than
n(1) over the whole relevant domain. An increase in the arrival rate of recessions makes it
more likely that the market leader is weak, encouraging R&D: this is the discouragement-
effect "in reverse". This should increase growth. On the other hand, research activity is a
negative function of the arrival rate of recessions; the intuition being that the prospect of
losing strong market leadership earlier decreases the expected gains from fundamental
innovations. This reward-effect "in reverse" decreases growth. Overall, the discouragement






Note: i=1 denotes weak marketleadership;i=2 denotes strong marketleadership.





Note: i=1 denotes weak marketleadership;i=2 denotes strong marketleadership.
Figure 2: Effect of recessions on economic growth and research.
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5. Dynamics
The next step in our analysis is an investigation of the dynamics of our economy. To that
end, we follow Aghion and Howitt (1992) by calculating the marginal cost and marginal
benefit of research activity. For the two equilibria in our economy it should hold that
The marginal cost of doing research on the LHS of this expression follows from eq. 6, and
(12)
the definition ofω. The marginal benefit of doing research on the RHS is determined from
eq. 4 (dated atf+1), and the definition ofπ̃.3
Both equilibria are graphically illustrated in Figure 3. The marginal cost curves are
denoted byMC and are upward sloping. The downward sloping curvesMB represent
marginal benefits from research effort. PointH(igh) [L(ow)] denotes the economy’s
equilibrium position when the intermediate firm is in state 1 [2]. Sincen(1)>n(2), the
probability of fundamental innovations, and thereby the rate of creative destruction, will be
higher in pointH.
Since both recessions and fundamental innovations bring the economy back in state
1, we can consider pointH as the attractor of the system. To evaluate the stability of the
attractor we proceed along the following lines. It follows from eq. 5 that
Substituting the stationary equilibrium expressions forn(i) and π̃(i) in terms of Ṽ(i) into the
(13)
latter expression gives
3 Notice that when µ=ν=0 equation 12 simplifies to
which is identical to eq. 3.1 in Aghion and Howitt (1992) with a linear research technolo-
gy.
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where Φ is a nonlinear function, stated precisely in the Technical Appendix. The steady
(14)
state is locally stable, ifDΦ1>1.
In the Technical Appendix we calculate that derivative, but it is hard to analyze
analytically. Using parameter values from Example 3, we findDΦ1=5.97. Thus, for these
parameters, the economic system follows a stable gradual adjustment trajectory, before
settling down in equilibrium.
Figure 3: Dynamics.
6. Social planner
The balanced growth rate in a market economy may not be optimal from a society’s point
of view because of two external effects and an additional distortion. Firstly, intermediate
firms cannot fully appropriate the rents generated by their fundamental innovations: the
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new technology ultimately spills over to other firms. Because of this intertemporal
spillover effect, research activity and economic growth tend to be too low under laissez
faire. On the other hand, innovating firms do not internalize the destruction of rents from
leapfrogging the incumbent monopolist. This business-stealing effect will tend to overemp-
hasize the benefits from research. Finally, the intermediate goods producer chooses its
quantity monopolistically, possibly distorting the first best solution. In addition to these
market imperfections, we want to raise the question whether strong firm-customer
relationships are socially desirable or not. As we have seen, the discouragement effect that
strong market leaders exert on potential entrants will lead to less R&D activity in the
economy. However, the fact that strong market leaders can appropriate a larger share of
the social value of their innovation since they can partly shelter from the threat of being
leapfrogged by a new entrant, will encourage research activity.
The objective of a social planner is to choose R&D labour and thus quantities of
the intermediate good in order to maximize the expected present value of consumption,
subject to the constraints of feasibility. The social planners problem can be written as a
dynamic program, which can be rewritten as (cf. the Technical Appendix)
whereU(i) is the utility level when the economy is in statei. Compare eq. 15 to eq. 4 for
(15)
the firm values in equilibrium. The upper left hand element of the matrix in eq. 15
contains the additional term -λn(1)γ compared to eq. 4, reflecting the fact that R&D is
valuable to the social planner, but not to the existing firm. The same holds true for the
term -λn(2)γ in the lower left hand element of that matrix.
Inverting the 2×2 matrix in eq. 15, and weighting lifetime utility in each state by
the average fraction of time that the economy will spend in each state (cf. eq. 9), we
finally express lifetime utility as
whereΞ is a function, stated precisely in the Technical Appendix.
(16)
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An optimizing social planner would selectn(i) such that
Since we were not able to obtain an equilibrium solution in closed-form, we resort to
(17)
numerical simulations to discuss the effect of learning-by-doing and recessions on the
economy’s growth rate. The implications for growth and research from variation in µ
within the closed unit interval are illustrated in Figure 4. Panel (a) shows a positive
relation between the economy’s average growth rate and the arrival rate µ of marginal
innovations for values of µ exceeding (say) 0.1. The intuition behind this result and why
and how it differs from Figure 1 can most easily be developed with the help of Panel (b)
and Panel (c) of Figure 4. In the second Panel we show the optimal research program that
a social planner would implement. It shows that the social planner allocates more workers
to research if the market leader is strong. Intertemporal reallocations of skilled labour
between production and research activities are intensified compared to the decentralized
equilibrium situation. What is at work here, is that the gains related to a particular state of
the economy are optimally used. An economy can better reallocate skilled workers from
production towards research activity when the incumbent monopolist is weak, in order to
fully exploit the temporary lower opportunity costs in terms of production forgone.
Likewise, during a boom when the market leader is particularly good at producing
intermediate inputs, one can better concentrate efforts in this direction, by relieving
employees from research activity and allocating these workers to the monopolistic firm.
Panel (b) also shows that research activity is intensified when µ is increased: the prospect
of being a strong market leader during a larger fraction of its lifetime increases the
expected gains from fundamental innovations, so that it is optimal to allocate more labour
to research activity. Two additional comments are in order. Firstly, research activity during
periods of strong market leadership is strongly reduced when it takes a long time to build
up such a leading position. When µ is in the interval between 0 and (say) 0.1, all research
activity is stopped and there is a stand-still in economic growth when the market leader is
strong. By doing so, a social planner thus chooses to completely entrench the incumbent
monopolist in the market. In the absence of the threat of a recession, this means that the
economy will settle down in a no-growth equilibrium and enjoy permanently well-
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established market relationships. Secondly, whereas a social planner would choose to do
more research compared to the decentralized equilibrium when the leading firm is weak,
the reverse not necessarily holds true in case of strong market leadership. A social planner
indeed opts for less research compared to a market economy in state 2 for a wide range of
µ, but may increase research activity relative to the decentralized equilibrium at higher
values for µ. The reward-effect is relatively strong in a social planner’s economy with
strong market leadership. The third panel shows that an economy in which a social planner
decides upon the optimal allocation of skilled labour across manufacturing and research
activity will spend (approximately) identical fractions of time in both states as a decentra-
lized economy for the upper range of investigated values for µ. For low values of µ, the
strong reduction in research activity in case of established market leadership actually leads
to an increaseof the probability of being in the strong state when µ is decreased, before
benching down to zero as µ goes to zero (this could not be fully illustrated in Figure 4
since we concentrate on interior equilibria only in this section). The implications for
average growth are the following. Without the possibility of learning-by-doing (so that we
are back in the Aghion-Howitt world), we findn(1)=0.33 which is higher than in decentrali-
zed equilibrium: the socially desirable growth rate is higher than economic growth in the
market economy in the absence of marginal innovations (this corresponds to earlier
findings in Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Average economic growth declines for low arrival
rates of marginal innovations, because of the sharp reduction in R&D activity when the
market leader becomes strong. This drop in research effort makes the strong monopolist
less vulnerable to attacks by potential entrants, and may even lead to complete entrench-
ment and a stand-still in economic growth (recall from the fourth section that in a
decentralized setting the discouragement-effect dominates the reward-effect when firms
need a long learning period). For higher values of µ we find a positive relationship
between economic growth and the arrival rates of marginal innovations: the prospect of
having established positions during a larger fraction of the monopolists’ lifetime will
encourage research activity, and this effect is stronger than the fact that the economy will
spend more time in the strong state when less research activity is going on.
We secondly vary the arrival rate of a recessionν within the closed unit interval






Note: i=1 denotes weak marketleadership,i=2 denotes strong marketleadership.





Note: i=1 denotes weak marketleadership;i=2 denotes strong marketleadership.
Figure 5: Effect of recessions on economic growth and research, social planner.
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shows a positive relationship between the economy’s average growth rate andν. This re-
sult is explained by the fact that research activity is much higher when the monopolistic
firm is a weak market leader (see Panel (b) in the figure), and the economy will on
average spend more time in the recessionary state asν increases (cf. Panel (c)). However,
Panel (b) also shows that research efforts in both states of the economy decline when
recessions become likely, but this turns out not to alter the positive effect from recessions
on economic growth in this example.
7. Implications for policy
In the previous section we derived the optimal research program that a benevolent social
planner would implement under the extreme assumption that this social planner can decide
upon the optimal allocation of skilled labour across production and research activity. Here
we relax this assumption and investigate the possibility of "finetuning" by the government
through implementation of an optimal tax program.
A government can implement the social planner’s solution by using the appropriate
tax instruments as follows. We concentrate the analysis on the steady state interior
solution. Let a social planner’s solution (nS
(1),nS
(2)) be given. Denoting the tax rate on
production workers in the monopolistic firm in statei by τP(i), the optimality condition (eq.
8) now rewrites to (supressing the subscript for the fundamental innovation,f)
Similarly, and denoting the tax rate on research workers in the research sector when the
(8’)
leading monopolist is in statei by τR(i), the optimality condition (eq. 6) now reads as
Tax rates are not restricted to be positive, and effectively turn into subsidies when they are
(6’)
negative. The government is supposed to stick to a balanced budget rule
Notice that this equation makes use of the fact that net wage payments to workers are
(18)
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equal in the two sectors for a given state of the economyi. It can be shown that the
optimal tax rates are given by (see the Technical Appendix for details)
In words, eq. 19b (which directly follows from the government’s balanced budget
(19a)
(19b)
assumption) says that both tax rates are opposite in sign (sincen(i) is strictly less thanN
for interior solutions), and their mutual proportion is determined by the sectoral allocation
of skilled workers: for a given tax (subsidy) on production labour, subsidies (taxes) on
research workers increase when less people are engaged in research activity.
Let us return to some numerical examples from the third section to illustrate these
policy implications. In the first example we assumed the absence of marginal leaps and
recessions, so that we are back in the Aghion-Howitt world. Research intensity in
decentralized equilibrium equals 0.306, whereasnS=0.333 is the socially desirable research
effort. A tax on production labour of 2.24% in combination with a subsidy on research
activity of 4.49% leads to an optimal solution in the market economy. In our second
example ("Learning-by-Doing"), we allowed intermediate firms to strengthen their market
position by building up a base of loyal customers. The arrival rate of marginal leaps (µ)
was set at 0.5. In this example we found(1)=0.399 andn(2)=0.279: the creation of a loyal
customer base by the intermediate firm discourages research activity by potential entrants.
A benevolent social planner would choosenS
(1)=0.423 together withnS
(2)=0.262. Intertem-
poral reallocations of skilled labour are more pronounced in a planned economy. Compa-
red to the decentralized equilibrium, a social planner opts for more research activity when
the leading monopolist is weak, and reduces research efforts when the market leader is
strong. A social optimum can be implemented in the decentralized economy by the
following tax program:τP(1)=0.24%, τP(2)=-0.69%, τR(1)=-0.33%, τR(2)=1.93%. Thus, it is
optimal to introduce a stochastic tax system in which the use of production labour is taxed
when the market leader is weak and subsidized in case of strong market leadership,
whereas research activity is subsidized when the leading monopolist is weak and taxed
under a strong intermediate monopolist. At first glance, this may seem counterintuitive:
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production activity should be encouraged during good times, and discouraged during
recessions and when the leading firm is weak. What is at work here is that the gains
related to a particular state of the economy are optimally used. One can better tax
production labour when the incumbent monopolist is weak, and subsidize research activity
in order to fully exploit the temporary lower opportunity costs in terms of production
forgone. Likewise, during a boom when the leading monopolist is particularly good at
producing intermediate inputs, one can better give an additional incentive for production
labour and discourage research activity.
The possibility of recessions was introduced in the third example ("Learning-by-
Doing and Recessions") by setting the flow probability of recessions,ν, at 0.2. An
equilibrium solution was found forn(1)=0.380 andn(2)=0.256. By settingnS
(1)=0.403 and
nS
(2)=0.249, a social planner again increases research activity when the monopolist is weak
and reduces R&D when the market leader is strong (compared to the decentralized
equilibrium without taxation). The optimal tax program is now given byτP(1)=1.16%,
τP(2)=0.13%,τR(1)=-1.72%,τR(2)=-0.39%. For the case of weak market leadership, this result
has a straightforward interpretation: too much production activity and too little research is
going on, so that the former activity should be discouraged via taxation and the latter
encouraged via subsidies. But when the market leader is strong one should actually tax
production labour and subsidize research activity in order toeduce research intensity!
What is at work here, is a general equilibrium effect. The introduction of recessions
implies that boom states become less likely, and the economy will more often be in a
recessionary state. Compared to the decentralized equilibrium, the social planner needs to
subsidize R&D when the leading monopolist is weak. This weak market leader has to pay
taxes to finance the research subsidies. Since the market leader spends a larger fraction of
its lifetime in a weak state (compared to the previous example), this may lower its value
by a substantial amount. Since firms in the research sector expect substantially lower gains
from innovative activity, they may actually decide to undertake less research activity than
in a competitive equilibrium without taxation. This R&D fall might already be more than
the social planner wants, so that research activity should be subsidized in a boom. This
again lowers the value of the monopolistic firm, so that the social planner needs to
stimulate R&D even more, and so on.
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As a final example, we look at the case in which marginal leaps become more
likely compared to the previous example by increasing the arrival rate of marginal
innovations to 1 (holding the other parameters constant). A market equilibrium solution is
given by n(1)=0.396 andn(2)=0.275. A social optimum is attained whennS
(1)=0.420 and
nS
(2)=0.284. As before, a social planner increases research activity (in comparison with the
decentralized equilibrium) when the intermediate firm is weak. But now the optimal
research intensity when the leading monopolist is strong is higher than in the market
economy without taxation. The optimal tax program that implements the social optimum
in a decentralized economy is now given byτP(1)=1.83%,τP(2)=0.83%,τR(1)=-2.52%,τR(2)=-
2.10%. Production activity is too high in the market economy for both states, and taxing
production labour gives the appropriate incentives to establish the social optimum.
Likewise, too little research is going on in both states without government intervention.
Subsidizing research labour can restore the social optimum.











τP(1) 2.24% 0.24% 1.16% 1.83%
τP(2) - -0.69% 0.13% 0.83%
τR(1) -4.49% -0.33% -1.72% -2.52%
τR(2) - 1.93% -0.39% -2.10%
Table 1: Optimal taxation.
8. Conclusion
Newly established firms often try to secure their market position by building up a base of
loyal customers. Learning about customer needs or building up consumer recognition is a
time-consuming process, but without such customer bases, these firms find themselves
more vulnerable to attacks by competitors. While recessions may not destroy technological
leadership, they may be harmful for such firm-customer relationships.
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These ideas have been introduced within an Aghion-Howitt type model of creative
destruction. In the context of this model, recessions might be good for growth since they
weaken the incumbent firm’s position, and thereby stimulate research by outside firms.
The model allows for the extreme case where the leading firm can be so entrenched that
growth ceases, unless a recession shakes up its customer base. We find a one-to-one
relationship between the average growth rate and the cyclical variability, a U-shaped
relationship between the average speed of building up good customer relationships and the
average growth rate, and a positive relationship between the arrival rate of recessions and
average growth. The optimal use of skilled labour by a benevolent social planner has been
shown to exhibit larger reallocations between the intermediate monopolist and the research
sector when the leading firm moves from one state to the other. It is finally shown that an
appropriate stochastic tax program can restore the social planner’s solution. In some cases,
general equilibrium effects may generate interesting results, conflicting with intuition from
a partial equilibrium approach.
The analysis can be extended in several ways. Firstly, unemployment could be
introduced into the model by allowing for search on the labour market (cf. Aghion and
Howitt 1994). This would give a more plausible interpretation of recessions in our story.
Secondly, it would be more realistic to have a richer sector structure than the simple
structure of a single intermediate firm that was used here. Thirdly, our assumption that
learning-by-doing is an exogenous stochastic event rules out the possibility of strategic
behaviour at the part of the incumbent monopolist. It would be interesting to introduce
endogenous factors that affect the probability to become a strong market leader. These
issues are left for future research.
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Technical Appendix
2.2 The maximization problems
The f-th intermediate monopolist wants to maximize the valueVf of the firm. Let πf denote the
monopolist’s profit. At any instant in time, the monopolist can be in two different states.
Therefore, we find the following Bellman expressions:
In words, eq. A1.a says that when the intermediate firm is currently in the first state, it makes a
(A1.a)
(A1.b)
profit π(1). The probability of still being a monopolist after a small time intervaldt has elapsed is
equal to 1-λnf(1)dt. Within this interval, the (unconditional) probability of a marginal innovation is
µdt. By the event of a marginal innovation the monopolist switches to the second state, and the
firm’s value is given byV(2). With probability 1-µdt the firm does not make the transition to state 2
during the time interval, so that its value is still given byV(1). In equation A1.b the monopolist is
in the second state at timet, earning a profitπ(2). Now, the probability of still being alive after a
small time intervaldt has elapsed is equal to 1-λnf(2)dt. During this interval, the (unconditional)
probability of a recession isνdt. A recession destroys firm-customer relationships, so that the
monopolist switches back to the first state, and the firm’s value is given byV(1). With probability
1-νdt the firm does not suffer from a recession after the time interval has elapsed, so that its value
is still given byV(2).
Exploiting -rdt≈1-rdt and leaving out higher order terms, we rewrite the Bellman equations
to











SupposeṼ(i) is given. From the transition scheme for fundamental innovations, eqs. 2, 6, and the
definition of ω and Ṽ, in stationary equilibrium it holds that
Or,
(A5)





Given ω, we find x(i) and π̃(i) from









From Proposition 1, Step 2 and Step 3, and eqs. 4 and 5 we have
And
(A11)
Using these four steps, we proceed our proof of Proposition 2 by defining
(A12)
After some substitutions we end up with two equations in two unknowns
(A13)
Subtracting A16 from A15 gives after some manipulation
(A14)
(A15)
Multiplying A15 with ω1/(1-α)/Λ finally completes the proof of:
(A16)
Proposition 2:




Substituting the stationary equilibrium expressions forn and π̃ in terms ofṼ into eq. 13 gives
Or, abbreviated
(A17)
whereΦ is a nonlinear function. A18 corresponds to eq. 14 in the text.
(A18)
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Stability requires the derivative of the first row ofΦ to be larger than 1,i.e. DΦ1>1. To
evaluate the stability of the system, we differentiateṼf
(1) from eq. A18 w.r.t.Ṽf+1
(1)
Plugging in parameters from Example 3 givesDΦ1=5.97>1, so the system is stable.
(A19)
6 Social planner
Next we want to compare the laissez-faire equilibrium from section 2 with the outcome in a social
planner’s economy, in which the expected present value of consumption is maximized. Denoting





An economic interpretation of these expressions is the following. Expected lifetime utility of an
(A20.b)
economy with technology levelf at time t is determined by two components. Firstly by current
consumption, being the flow of production of the final goodAfF(.) - contingent on the current state
of the intermediate firm - over some small time intervaldt. Secondly by expected utility after this
small time intervaldt has elapsed, discounted atr. With probability λnf(1)dt (λnf(2)dt) a monopolist
who is currently in state 1 (2) will be replaced by a new intermediate firm within this time
interval, yielding a utility level ofU(f+1,1). When the incumbent firm is currently in state 1 and no
fundamental innovation took place, the economy will still be in state 1 with utilityU(f,1) with
probability 1-λnf(1)dt-µdt. With probability µdt the intermediate firm has made a marginal
innovation so that economy-wide utility is given byU(f,2). Similarly, when the monopolistic firm
is currently in state 2 and no fundamental innovation took place, the economy will fall back to
state 1 with utilityU(f,1) through the event of a recession with probabilityνdt. With probability 1-
νdt-λnf(2)dt the intermediate firm maintains to be active in state 2 so that economy-wide utility is
given byU(f,2).
Let U(1)=U(0,1) andU(2)=U(0,2). Using eq. 2, substituting-rdt≈1-rdt, multiplying out, and
dropping higher order terms, A20 becomes
And
(A21.a)
Or, in matrix notation,
(A21.b)
Inverting the 2×2 matrix in eq. A22, and weighting lifetime utility in each state by the average
(A22)
fraction of time that the economy will spend in each state (cf. eq. 9), we finally express lifetime
utility as
whereΞ is a nonlinear function:
(A23)
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An optimizing social planner would selectn(i) such that
Since we were not able to obtain an equilibrium solution in closed-form, we resort to numerical
(A24)
simulations to illustrate the optimal research program in this case.
7 Implications for policy
Step 1
Let a social planner’s solution (nS
(1),nS
(2)) be given. From the adjusted optimality condition eq. 8’,
we can calculate the gross wage paid by the leading monopolistω̂P(i)=(1+τP(i))ω(i).
Step 2
Plugging the solution forω̂P(i) obtained in Step 1 into the expression forπ̃(i) (cf. section 2 or eq. A9
in this appendix) gives the solution forπ̃(i).
Step 3
We use equation 4 to calculateV(1) andV(2).
Step 4
We use the modified version of equation 6, eq. 6’, to findω̂R(i)=(1+τR(i))ω(i).
Step 5
We finally end up with three equations -ω̂P(i)=(1+τP(i))ω(i), ω̂R(i)=(1+τR(i))ω(i), and the government’s
balanced budget restriction - in three unknowns,viz. τP(i), τR(i), and n(i). Rewriting τR(i) from the
government’s budget constraint in terms ofτP(i) andn(i), substituting this equation into the first one,
and substituting the second equation into the latter expression gives after some manipulation
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